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ABSTRACT
PERCEPTIONS OP EFFICACY AND SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTIVISM
SEPTEMBER, 1991
ROBERT T. SCHATZ, B. A., UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE
M. S. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Directed by: Professor leek Ajzen
This study was conducted to investigate the
relationship between perceptions of efficacy and socio-
political activism. Two primary distinctions between
perceptions of efficacy are advanced: political vs. issue-
specific efficacy, and personal vs. impersonal efficacy.
Political efficacy is defined as the belief that one can
influence the government and the political process; issue-
specific efficacy is defined as the belief that one can
influence the government and the political process with
regard to a particular socio-political issue. Personal
efficacy beliefs are defined as beliefs that one's own
actions can influence outcomes; impersonal efficacy beliefs
are defined as beliefs that outcomes can be influenced in
the abstract. Two hypotheses are advanced: 1) issue-
specific efficacy is more strongly associated with activist
behavior than political efficacy 2) personal efficacy
beliefs are more strongly associated with activist behavior
than impersonal efficacy beliefs. Three issues are
examined: the threat of nuclear war, the guality of the
iv
environment, and the current financial problems at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst. In the pilot
study, efficacy and activism scales were developed. In the
main study, the hypotheses were tested. Generally, the
results supported the hypotheses. The implication of this
research for socio-political action-taking is discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of psychology, theorists and
researchers have investigated the psychological factors
associated with behavioral performance in a variety of
domains. One factor that has been proposed to be an
important determinant of behavior is the degree to which an
individual believes that he or she has control over events
in the world. Interest in this construct is evidenced by
the volume of research, originating from a variety of
perspectives, that has emphasized its importance (see
Averill, 1973; Fiske & Taylor, 1984, Ch. 5, for reviews).
Theories of human behavior rooted in the traditions of
personality theory (Epstein, 1990) , social learning theory
(Bandura 1977, 1982, 1990; Rotter, 1966), attitudes (Ajzen,
1985, 1988; Ajzen & Madden, 1986; Festinger, 1957), and
social cognition (Janoff-Bulman, 1989) have independently
proposed that perceptions of control are an important
determinant of human behavior.
The concern of this article is the influence of
perceptions of control on the performance of a specific
type of behavior, namely socio-political activism. I will
review the findings of previous research that has attempted
to predict the performance of activist behaviors by
utilizing measures of perceived control. Two primary
distinctions among existing measures of perceived control
1
over political events will be explored and tested in an
effort to advance both our understanding and prediction of
socio-political action-taking.
Interest in perceived political control most likely
arose from interest in perceptions of control in general.
Perhaps the best known measure of controllability is
Rotter's (1966) internal-external (I-E) locus of control
scale. According to Rotter, a high internal score on this
scale indicates the generalized belief that one's outcomes
are under the control of one's behavior. In contrast, a
high external score indicates the belief that one's
outcomes are determined by external factors such as
powerful others or chance.
Researchers interested in the antecedents of political
activism have investigated the hypothesis that internals,
believing that they have control over outcomes, should be
more likely to engage in social and political action. The
results of this work have been discouraging (Levinson,
1981) . A review of 30 studies investigating the
relationship between I-E scores and socio-political action
taking (Klandermans, 1983) found that in 19 of these
studies no relationship was obtained. Of the remaining
studies, five reported relationships in the predicted
direction, four reported relationships in the opposite
direction, and two reported contradictory data. Indeed,
much of the work that has attempted to link I-E scores with
2
the performance of specific behaviors has failed to obtain
the hypothesized relationships (Lefcourt, 1981).
Within the realm of socio-political activism, a
similar construct, termed political efficacy, has been
utilized in an attempt to predict the performance of
activist behavior. Political efficacy refers to the belief
that one's actions can have an impact on the political
process (Pavelchak & Schofield, 1985) . A frequently used
measure among political activism researchers to tap into
this construct is Campbell's Political Efficacy Scale
(Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954), originally developed to
predict political participation in the 1952 presidential
election. This five-item measure is composed of statements
that refer to perceptions of control over the political
process in general, such as "I don't think public officials
care much about what people like me think" and "Voting is
the only way that people like me can have any say about how
the government runs things." Subjects' self-reported level
of agreement or disagreement with the statements serves as
the measure of perceived political efficacy.
As in the case with the I-E scale, researchers have
used political efficacy scores in an attempt to predict
various modes of socio-political activism for a variety of
political issues. Higher perceived political efficacy
scores are expected to be associated with greater activist
behavior. Again however, the results have been
disappointing. m the antinuclear war research, for
example, researchers who have used Campbell's Political
Efficacy Scale, or a variant of it, to predict involvement
in antinuclear war activism, have reported both significant
and nonsignificant results. Tyler and McGraw (1983), using
four items from the University of Michigan political
efficacy scale, two of which are present on Campbell's
scale, found that antinuclear activism was positively
correlated with political efficacy. Watanabe and Milburn
(1988) also report a positive relationship. However, only
one item (present on both Campbell's and the University of
Michigan scale), "People like me don't have any say about
what the government does," was used to measure political
efficacy. Locatelli and Holt (1986), using all five items
of Campbell's scale, found a positive relationship in a
pilot study but not in the main study. Fox and Schofield
(1989) reported no correlation. Lyon and Russo (1990)
report a positive correlation between political efficacy
and antinuclear behavior; however, neither the items nor
their source were reported. Thus, the results of studies
investigating general political efficacy, while generally
postive, are not as consistent as one might like.
The lack of a consistent relationship between
perceived political efficacy and nuclear activism is,
perhaps, not surprising. These results, and those obtained
using the I-E scale to predict different forms of socio-
political action taking, are to be expected in light of the
principle of compatibility (Ajzen, 1988; Ajzen & Fishbein,
1977). According to this principle, in order for a strong
statistical relationship between two indicators of a
disposition to result, the indicators must be assessed at
corresponding levels of generality or specificity. One can
not expect, for example, that one's attitude toward
religion will strongly correlate with one's church going
behavior. The individual's attitude toward religion may be
expressed in many possible behavioral domains besides
church attendance. However, one's attitude toward
attending church can be expected to correlate more strongly
with this behavior, as the attitude and behavior measures
are assessed at a corresponding level. In general, as the
correspondence between two measures of a disposition is
increased, the statistical relationship between these two
measures is also expected to increase.
Following this logic, the belief that one has control
over his or her outcomes in general cannot reasonably be
expected to predict behavior in the more specific domain of
socio-political activism. While political efficacy scales
assess perceptions that are within a more restricted domain
than the I-E scale, this domain is still much broader than
that of the behavior it attempts to predict. The belief
that one can have an influence on the political process may
be manifested in any number of ways and with regard to any
5
number of political issues, it is unreasonable, then, to
expect stronger feelings of political efficacy to
consistently predict activist behavior for a specific
issue. 1
To return to activism against nuclear war, we have
seen that there is no consistent relationship between
political efficacy and antinuclear war behavior. In order
to obtain a more consistent relationship, perceptions of
efficacy specific to nuclear war may have to be assessed.
Issue-specific, or in this case "nuclear" efficacy (Fox &
Schofield, 1989; Watanabe & Milburn, 1988), the belief that
one's actions can reduce the threat of nuclear war, would
be expected to correlate more consistently with antinuclear
behavior than general political efficacy because there is
greater compatibility between the efficacy and behavioral
measures.
Inspection of the literature is generally consistent
with the compatibility principle. The majority of studies
with compatible measures have found the predicted
relationship (Dyal & Morris, 1987; Kanofsky, 1990; Oskamp,
King, Burn, Konrad, & White, 1985; Rounds & Erdahl, 1988;
It may be reasonable, however, to expect feelings of
political efficacy to correlate with political activism in
general if many measures of behavior in a variety of areas are
assessed and aggregated (see Ajzen, 1988 for a discussion of the
aggregation principle)
.
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Tyler & McGraw, 1983)2, and two studies (Fox & Schofield,
1989; McKenzie & Dyal, 1988) have reported mixed results
depending on the behavioral measure used. Only one study,
Pavelchak and Schofield (1985), reported no significant
relationship between antinuclear efficacy and antinuclear
activism. Tyler and McGraw's (1983) study is particularly
noteworthy as these researchers separately analyzed
political efficacy and efficacy specifically related to
nuclear war within the same study by utilizing separate
scales to assess these two constructs. Responses to both
scales correlated positively with subjects' self-reports of
antinuclear behavior, but nuclear efficacy, which they
termed "war preventability , " was found to be more strongly
associated with antinuclear behavior than general political
efficacy. Lee and Schofield (1989) reported that nuclear
efficacy, but not political efficacy, was significantly
associated with future performance of an antinuclear
behavior, namely signing a petition supporting bilateral
disarmament. Thus, as would be predicted by the
compatibility principle, greater correspondence between the
2McClenney and Allbright (1985) report a positive
relationship between what they term the "Power" scale and
antinuclear behavioral intent. This scale combines perceived
nuclear efficacy and perceived responsibility to reduce the risk
of nuclear war. Since only the results of the Power scale are
reported, it is unclear whether or not nuclear efficacy alone
correlated positively with antinuclear behavioral intent in this
study.
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efficacy and activism measures results in a stronger
relationship between them.
While a few researchers have systematically examined
the distinction between political efficacy and issue-
specific efficacy, most have measured either one or the
other. Rarely are items measuring both constructs combined
into a single efficacy scale, so at some level the
importance of this distinction is recognized. There is,
however, another aspect of perceptions of efficacy that has
received little if any attention, namely the distinction
between impersonal and personal beliefs (Fishbein, 1979)
.
Impersonal, or general beliefs, are beliefs about the
outcomes that will result from the performance of a
behavior. Personal beliefs, on the other hand, are beliefs
concerning the outcomes that will result from one's own
performance of a behavior. For example, an impersonal
belief with regard to perceptions of political efficacy
might be assessed by an item such as "I believe that the
government can be influenced by writing elected officials."
An item assessing a personal political efficacy belief
might be "I believe that I can influence the government by
writing elected officials."
Unfortunately, few, if any, activism researchers
distinguish between personal and impersonal beliefs and
sometimes combine both types of beliefs within a single
efficacy scale (e.g., Dyal & Morris, 1987). Rationally,
there is reason to believe that these two types of beliefs
would be differentially associated with activist behavior.
Someone who strongly endorses items such as "Government
policy regarding the environment can be influenced by
lobbying elected representatives" would be considered to
have high environmental efficacy. However, while this
individual believes that lobbying can be an effective way
to influence the government's environmental policy, it is
unclear whether or not this person believes that he or she
can influence the government's environmental policy by
performing this or any other behavior. On the other hand,
a personal efficacy belief, for example, "I believe that I
can influence government policy regarding the environment
by lobbying elected representatives," indicates the
individual's belief that his or her own behavior will be
effective. Since self-report behavior items ask the
respondent if he or she has engaged in various behaviors,
personal efficacy beliefs items are the more compatible
measure; a higher correlation with the performance of
environmental activist behaviors is expected.
On average then, personal efficacy beliefs are
predicted to be more highly associated with activist
behavior than impersonal efficacy beliefs. Although, to
the best of my knowledge, there are no data within the
activist literature in support of this hypothesis, a study
conducted by Fishbein (1979) in a different domain
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generated data that are supportive. This study was
concerned with predicting behavioral intent with regard to
cigarette smoking from beliefs and attitudes concerning
this behavior. Fishbein found that beliefs and attitudes
towards "my smoking" or "my not smoking," i.e., personal
beliefs, were more strongly correlated with behavioral
intent to smoke (or not to smoke) than beliefs and
attitudes toward smoking in general. Thus, these results
provide some support, albeit indirect, for the prediction
that personal efficacy beliefs are more strongly related to
activist behavior than impersonal efficacy beliefs.
The purpose of the present study was to test the
utility of the political vs. issue-specific efficacy, and
impersonal vs. personal efficacy beliefs distinctions.
Four classifications of efficacy perceptions result:
impersonal political efficacy, personal political efficacy,
impersonal issue-specific efficacy, and personal issue-
specific efficacy. The following definitions will be
adopted: Impersonal political efficacy (IPE) refers to the
belief that the political process can be influenced by
political action taking; personal political efficacy (PPE)
refers to the belief that one's own political actions can
influence the political process; impersonal issue-specific
efficacy (HE) refers to the belief that the political
process concerning a specific issue (e.g., the threat of
nuclear war, the state of the environment) can be
10
ssue-
influenced by political action taking; personal is
specific efficacy (PIE) refers to the belief that one's own
political actions can influence the political process
concerning a specific issue.
Of course, there are additional potential distinctions
among measures of perceived efficacy other than the ones
tested in this study. For example, McKenzie-Mohr and Dyal
(1988) have proposed that an individual's perceptions of
group-based or collective efficacy might be more strongly
associated with antinuclear war activism than an
individual's perceptions of his or her own efficacy working
alone. Theoretically, however, there is no reason to
expect collective efficacy to be more highly associated
with activism, even in the antinuclear war domain where an
individual is likely to feel particularly powerless to
effect change on his or her own. In fact, one might
predict the opposite. Someone who does feel able to effect
change on his or her own would likely have particularly
high efficacy beliefs and therefore might be expected to
engage in considerable antinuclear behavior. However, a
study that did examine individual and collective
perceptions of efficacy independently (Kanofsky, 1990)
,
found that both correlated with antinuclear behavior almost
equally (r = .31 for individual, r = .29 for collective),
and that responses to the two scales themselves were highly
correlated (r = .77).
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One possible explanation for Kanofsky's results is
that it is unclear whether respondents necessarily
interpret individual efficacy items such as, "I feel I can
have an impact on the political process, » to mean that they
can have an impact on the political process by themselvp* .
Group-based efficacy items such as, "Citizens working
together can have an impact on the political process," on
the other hand, make it clear to respondents that they are
to indicate their perceptions of the efficacy of the
collective. Individual efficacy items, then, would assess
a broader range of efficacy perceptions than would group-
based items. Therefore, in the present study it was
decided to frame all personal efficacy items at the
individual level.
Previous research has primarily examined perceptions
of the efficacy of general actions (e.g., influencing
government policies)
. While such efficacy items imply the
performance of more specific behaviors (e.g., signing a
petition, writing a letter to a representative) , the
specific behaviors that one might engage in are not made
explicit. However, the majority of activist behavior
measures are created by aggregating the number of times
subjects performed relatively specific behaviors (e.g.,
writing letters to public officials or sending money to an
activist organization) . Here, the specific behaviors that
one might have engaged in are made explicit. Thus, in the
12
present study, "explicit action" efficacy items were
developed to assess the perceived efficacy of performing
relatively specific behaviors in addition to the more
general, or "implicit action" efficacy measures used in
prior research. In total, then, three distinctions between
perceptions of efficacy will be tested in this study:
political vs. issue-specific efficacy, personal vs.
impersonal beliefs, and implicit vs. explicit action
efficacy. While no predictions are advanced concerning the
implicit vs. explicit action efficacy distinction, the
possibility that the two measures correlate differentially
with activism will be examined. Even among the more
specific types of activist behaviors that researchers
commonly utilize to measure activism, it is likely that a
great deal of variation exists. It is important to realize
that antinuclear activity (Waldron, Baron, Frese, & Sabini,
1988)
,
as well as activism for other issues may not fall on
a single dimension. For example, McKenzie & Dyal (1988)
suggest that conventional forms of activity (e.g.,
information gathering and discussion) should be
distinguished from more unconventional forms of activity
(e.g., demonstrating). Of course, a variety of other
dimensions of activist behavior may exist. For example,
feelings of efficacy may be differentially associated with
activist behaviors taken within existing political channels
(e.g., writing letters to public officials), and activist
13
behaviors taken outside existing political channels (e.g.,
demonstrating or picketing)
. while no such predictions
will be advanced in this study, the possibility that
different dimensions of activist behavior exist and
influence the efficacy-activism relation will be explored.
Two hypotheses are advanced. l) Issue-specific
efficacy (whether personal or impersonal) is more strongly
associated with activist behavior than is political
efficacy. Thus, environmental efficacy, or efficacy
beliefs with regard to improving the quality of the
environment for example, is expected to correlate more
highly with environmental activism than beliefs regarding
general political efficacy. 2) Personal efficacy beliefs
(whether political or issue-specific) are more strongly
associated with activist behavior than are impersonal
efficacy beliefs.
Three issues, the threat of nuclear war, the state of
the environment, and the current financial situation at the
University of Massachusetts at Amherst were used to test
these predictions. The threat of nuclear war was an issue
of substantial concern during the 1980 's. A vast amount of
psychological research was conducted during this period
examining the public's reaction to this tragic possibility
(see Fiske, 1987; Schatz & Fiske, in press for reviews).
Likelihood perceptions and worry about nuclear war peaked
during the first half of the 1980s, leveled off, and
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subsequently declined. Currently, nuclear war is not a
particularly salient issue among the general public (Schatz
& Fiske, in press). Therefore, antinuclear activism may
currently be on the wane; however, I am not aware of any
recent estimates. Thus, while the threat of nuclear war
may not be a good issue by which to test the efficacy-
activism relation, at the very least, the results will
provide a current estimate of the amount of antinuclear
activity on a college campus.
While concern about nuclear war has diminished, the
state of the environment is currently one of the fastest
growing concerns in this country, and indeed throughout
much of the world. The growth of the environmental
movement is evidenced in national polls (Gallup Polls,
1988-1989; Gallup & Newport, 1990), increased media
coverage (Allen, 1990) , and the rise of grass roots
movements devoted to protecting and improving the quality
of the environment (Painton, 1990) . Concern about the
environment is not limited to any particular demographic
group, and indeed the current environmental movement is
broad-based (Gallup Poll, 1989; Gallup & Newport, 1990;
Painton, 1990) . Importantly, a significant increase in
concern among college students has developed over the last
few years (Dodge, 1990) . Thus, concern about the
environment presents a good opportunity to explore the
efficacy-activism relation.
In selecting a third issue to examine, I decided to
take advantage of an issue that has recently begun to
affect undergraduates at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, namely, the level of funding for the university.
In an effort to balance the Massachusetts state budget, a
series of cuts in public higher education dollars has hit
the university over the last year. These cuts have already
adversely impacted the campus community due to a hiring
freeze on both administrative and faculty positions, a
reduction in the number of courses offerings, increased
tuition and fees, and decreased student enrollment.
Further cuts of yet unknown proportions are likely to
ensue, and entire academic and student support programs are
predicted to be either substantially reduced or eliminated
altogether. Some students on this campus have already
taken action to fight these cuts. For example, a number of
University of Massachusetts students joined students from
other state universities in a demonstration at the state's
capital to protest the cuts in funding for higher education
in Massachusetts. Thus, both the level of state
educational funding and the quality of the environment are
issues that can be expected to inspire enough political
action-taking to test the efficacy-activism predictions
that have been advanced.
16
eCHAPTER 2
PILOT STUDY
Before testing the hypotheses it was necessary to
develop items to measure IPE, PPE, he, and PIE. While
some existing efficacy items might adequately assess the
proposed classifications, none had been designed for this
purpose. Therefore, all items used in the pilot study were
either modified versions of existing items or were written
by the experimenter. Most importantly, there are no
existing scales that measure the four proposed efficacy
classifications. Therefore, a pilot study was conducted to
develop such scales.
Method
Subjects
One hundred fifty-three undergraduates enrolled in at
least one psychology class at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst participated in the study
purportedly assessing people's perceptions of the
government and the operation of the political system.
Subjects were tested in groups. Of the total sample, 39
were male, 110 were female and four did not indicate
gender. All subjects received one experimental credit for
their participation.
Materials and Procedures
Efficacy Beliefs . Impersonal political efficacy items
were constructed to measure the extent to which respondents
17
believed that the government can be influenced (e.g., "it
is possible to influence government policies"). Personal
political efficacy items, on the other hand, were
constructed to measure the extent to which respondents
believed that they themselves are capable of influencing
the government (e.g., "I can influence government
policies"). A total of 21 items was created for each type
of political efficacy (see Appendices 1 and 2).
Of these 21 items, five were written to assess
perceptions of the efficacy of performing activist
behaviors at a relatively general level, the implicit
action efficacy measure, and 16 were written to assess
perceptions of the efficacy of performing more specific
activist behaviors, the explicit action efficacy measure.
The implicit action political efficacy items were loosely
based on political efficacy items used by Campbell et al.,
(1954) and Tyler & McGraw (1983). The above examples of a
personal and impersonal political efficacy item are also
implicit action efficacy items. The explicit action
efficacy items were created by framing efficacy statements
around behaviors that have served as political activism
measures in the antinuclear war (McKenzie-Mohr & Dyal,
1988; Locatelli & Holt, 1986; Werner & Roy, 1985) and
environmental (Bachrach & Zautra, 1985; Taylor & Dorceta,
1989) activism literature. For example, the activist
behavior of petition signing generated the explicit action
18
personal political efficacy item, "By signing petitions, I
can help to change the way things are run in this country,"
and the explicit action impersonal political efficacy item,
"Signing petitions can help to change the way things are
run in this country."
Issue-specific efficacy items were developed by
modifying the political efficacy items such that the items
referred specifically to each of the issues to be tested.
For example, a personal issue-specific efficacy item for
improving the quality of the environment was created by
modifying the above personal political efficacy item to
read "By signing petitions, I can help to improve the
quality of the environment." In this manner, a total of 21
personal issue-specific items, and 21 impersonal issue-
specific items were created for each issue. As with the
political efficacy items, five implicit action efficacy
items (e.g., "I can get the government to work toward
improving the quality of the environment"), and 16 explicit
action efficacy items (e.g., "I can improve the quality of
the environment by writing or phoning public officials")
were constructed.
In addition, three personal and three impersonal
environmental efficacy items were created by the
experimenter. These items were developed to assess the
perceived efficacy of behaviors thought to be important,
but limited to, the domain of environmental activism:
19
boycotting environmentally irresponsible products, picking
up litter, and participating in a recycling program. Thus,
a total of 24 personal and 24 impersonal issue-specific
efficacy items were created for the environment. All
efficacy items, both political and issue-specific, were
framed as statements (see Appendices 3-8 for all issue-
specific efficacy items)
. Subjects responded to each item
on a 5-point scale with "strongly agree" and "strongly
disagree" as anchors.
Activism
.
The sixteen political activism items were
constructed from the same behaviors used to construct the
explicit action political efficacy items. Thus, each of
the political activism items corresponded to one of the
explicit action political efficacy items (see Appendix 9)
.
Like the issue-specific efficacy items, the issue-specific
activism items were created by modifying the political
activism items so that they referred specifically to the
three issues to be tested. For example, the antinuclear
activism item, "tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war
by signing a petition" was developed from the political
activism item, "signed a petition." Since the number of
activism items for each issue corresponded to the number of
explicit action efficacy items for that issue, 16 activism
items were developed for reducing the threat of nuclear
war, 16 for improving the financial situation at U Mass,
and 19 for improving the quality of the environment (see
20
Appendices 10, 11, and 12). Subjects responded to the
activism items by indicating how often they have engaged in
each of the behaviors in the past six months on a 6-point
scale with "never" and "over 20 times" as anchors.
Design
Type of efficacy belief, i.e., personal and
impersonal, and the object of that belief, i.e.,
influencing the government, reducing the threat of nuclear
war, improving the quality of the environment, or improving
the financial situation at U Mass, served as between-
subjects independent variables with presentation order of
the efficacy and behavior items counterbalanced across
conditions. Implicit and explicit action efficacy items
served as a within-subjects variable as subjects in each
condition responded to both types of efficacy items. The
implicit action efficacy items were presented before the
explicit action efficacy items. Order of presentation
within each of these two sets of items was random but the
same for each of the four efficacy belief objects. The
three additional environmental efficacy items appeared in
random order at the end of the explicit action efficacy
items. A separate randomization was employed for all four
sets of activism items. Again, the three additional
environmental activism items were separately randomized and
appeared at the end of the set.
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Questionnaires that contained a set of political
efficacy items also contained a set of political activi:
items and a set of one of the three issue-specific activism
items. Both types of activism items were included so that
the strength of their relationships with political efficacy
could be compared. Questionnaires that contained a set of
issue-specific efficacy items for one of the three issues
also contained a set of activism items for the same issue.
Since both personal and impersonal efficacy belief items
were constructed, and presentation order was
counterbalanced across conditions, a total of 24 different
versions of the questionnaire were constructed, 12
containing a set of political efficacy items and 12
containing a set of issue-specific efficacy items (see
Appendix 13)
.
Results
The pilot study was conducted to develop reliable
scales to measure the IPE, PPE, HE, and PIE efficacy
classifications. Standardized alpha coefficients were
computed using the reliability procedure in the SPSS-X
statistical program. The majority of scales demonstrated
adequate reliabilities with alpha coefficients typically
ranging between .75 and .92. However, four efficacy scales
were of questionable or poor reliability: the personal
beliefs-explicit action environmental efficacy scale (alpha
=
.68), the impersonal beliefs-implicit action political
22
efficacy scale (alpha =
.71), and the impersonal beliefs-
implicit action nuclear efficacy and environment efficacy
scales (alphas = .08, .55 respectively). since three of
the four problematic scales were impersonal beliefs-
implicit action efficacy scales, new items were developed
and tested in order to construct more reliable measures.
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CHAPTER 3
PILOT STUDY TWO
Method
Subjects
Sixty-eight undergraduates enrolled in at least one
psychology class at the University of Massachusetts at
Amherst participated in the study purportedly assessing
people's perceptions of the government and the operation of
the political system. As in the first pilot study,
subjects were tested in groups. Of the total sample, 2 0
were male and 48 were female. All subjects received one
experimental credit for their participation.
Materials and Procedures
Fifteen impersonal beliefs-implicit action political
efficacy items were constructed. An egual number of items
were constructed for each of the three issues by modifying
the political efficacy items such that the items referred
specifically to each issue. Corresponding personal
beliefs-implicit action items were also developed so that
the resulting personal and impersonal beliefs scales would
correspond to one another. Order of presentation for each
set of 15 items was random and the same for each set (see
"Materials and Procedures" section for the first pilot
study)
.
Half of the subjects completed a guestionnaire
containing 60 personal beliefs-implicit action efficacy
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items, 15 for political efficacy and 15 for each of the
three issues. The other half of the subjects completed the
corresponding set of items framed as impersonal beliefs.
The political efficacy items were presented first, followed
by the three sets of issue-specific efficacy items.
Presentation order for the three sets of issue-specific
efficacy items was counterbalanced across the belief
conditions
.
Results
Reliabilities were excellent; standardized item alpha
coefficients exceeded .93 for all eight 15-item scales.
After examining item-total correlations, five of the 15
items were selected from each scale for use in the main
study (see Appendices 14 and 15) . Standardized alpha
coefficients for the 5-item scales ranged from .81 to .93
for the four impersonal belief scales, and from .88 to .93
for the four personal beliefs scales. Thus, the impersonal
beliefs-implicit action efficacy scales, and corresponding
personal belief scales, both demonstrated adequate
reliability and could be utilized in the main study.
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CHAPTER 4
MAIN STUDY
Method
Subjects
Three hundred ninety undergraduates enrolled in at
least one psychology class at the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst participated in the study. The
alleged purpose of the study was identical to that in the
two pilot studies, and subjects were again tested in
groups, of the total sample, 112 were male, 276 were
female, and two did not indicate gender. All subjects
received one experimental credit for their participation.
Materials and Procedures
The guestionnaires were identical to those used in the
first pilot study with two exceptions: 1. The new implicit
action efficacy scales were utilized. 2. A set of
instructions was added to the guestionnaires in order to
more clearly convey the intended meaning of the personal
and impersonal belief items. In the personal beliefs
condition, participants were instructed to indicate to what
extent they believed that they "personally " could have an
influence. Conversely, in the impersonal beliefs
condition, participants were instructed indicate to what
extent they believed that " it is possible " to have an
influence, "not your beliefs concerning your personal
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ability to do so." Otherwise, the questionnaires and all
procedures were unchanged.
Results
Scale Reliabili ties and Mean gfiSEflfl
Reliabilities were again calculated for all scales.
Standardized alpha coefficients ranged from .82 to .95 for
the personal beliefs efficacy scales,
.81 to .87 for the
impersonal beliefs efficacy scales, and from .84 to .92 for
the activism scales (see Table 1). Thus, all scales used
in the study demonstrated high reliability.
Means and standard deviations for the efficacy and
behavior scores are presented in Table 2. Responses to the
19-item environmental explicit action efficacy and activism
scales were compared to the corresponding 16-item scales.
Self-reported efficacy and activism scores were
significantly higher for both the 19-item explicit action-
environmental efficacy scale, t(129) - 9.03, p <.001, and
environmental activism scale, t(129) = 23.57, p < .001.
However, the 16-item and 19-item scales were very highly
correlated (r = .99 for the efficacy scales, r = .93 for
the activism scales) . Due to these high intercorrelations
,
and the fact that 16-item environmental scales corresponded
to the nuclear war and U Mass scales, the 19-item scales
were not used in any further analyses.
27
Table 1
Efficacy and Activism Scale Reliabilities
Efficacy Scales
Personal
Efficacy Type n
Political
Implicit Action 102
Explicit Action 101
Nuclear
Implicit Action 32
Explicit Action 32
U Mass
Implicit Action 32
Explicit Action 32
Environmental
Implicit Action 32
Explicit Action 32
Explicit Action* 32
Activism Scales
Activism Type n
Political 195
Antinuclear 130
U Mass 130
Environmental 129
Environmental* 129
Beliefs Impersonal Beliefs
alpha n alpha
•8214 96 .8064
•8211 96 .8717
•9244 32 .8503
•9466 32 .8464
•9268 32 .8632
•9223 32 .8521
•8936 32 .8014
.8529 32 .8315
.8615 32 .8367
alpha
.8395
.9167
.8744
.8629
.8596
* Alphas calculated utilizing the 19-item Environmental
scales.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations on Efficacy and Activism
Scales
Efficacy Scalps
Efficacy Type
Nuclear
Implicit Action
Explicit Action
Average Efficacy
U Mass
Implicit Action
Explicit Action
Average Efficacy
Personal BeliPfg
M SD
Political
Implicit Action 3.30
Explicit Action 3.29
Average Efficacy 3.29
38
38
38
39
30
32
Environmental
Implicit Action 3.65
Explicit Action 3.61
Explicit Action* 3.74
Average Efficacy 3.62
Average Efficacy* 3.72
745
508
506
898
794
785
924
698
715
748
455
419
461
436
Impersonal BeliP.fs
M SD
3.49
3.90
3.59
66
31
39
63
48
52
3.94
3.68
3.81
3.74
3.84
559
572
519
675
533
494
678
533
513
639
488
442
473
440
Activism Scales
Activism Type M SD
Political
Antinuclear
U Mass
Environmental
Environmental
*
1.82 .529
1.38 .536
1.68 .507
1.56 .443
1.93 .484
* Means and standard deviations calculated utilizing the
19-item Environmental scales
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tin
.ear war
All efficacy scores were collapsed across belief type
(personal or impersonal) and action type (implicit acti,
efficacy or explicit action efficacy)
, in order to obta:
mean ef ficacyscores for reducing the threat of nucl,
(M = 3.38), improving the guality of the environment (M =
3.68), and improving the financial situation at U Mass (M =
3.42). A one-way ANOVA revealed that mean levels of
efficacy differed significantly by issue F(2,189) = 4.77, p
< .01. The Student-Newman-Keuls (SNK) procedure revealed
that the environmental efficacy scores were significantly
higher than both the nuclear war and U Mass efficacy scores
which did not differ significantly from each other. Mean
levels of activism also differed significantly by issue
F(2,387) = 11.74, p < .001. The SNK procedure revealed
that the environmental and U Mass activism scores (Ms =
1.56 and 1.68 respectively) were both significantly higher
than the antinuclear war activism scores (M = 1.38), but
did not differ significantly from each other. As expected,
the state of the environment and the financial problems at
the university stimulated more activism than did the threat
of nuclear war.
Condition Effects
Efficacy and activism scores were subjected to a 4-way
Efficacy Condition (Issue-specific vs. Political) X Beliefs
Condition (Personal vs. Impersonal) X Order Condition
(Efficacy items first vs. Activism items first) X Issue
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Condition (Nuclear War vs. Environment vs. U Mass) analysis
of variance. These analyses were performed to examine the
possibility that condition assignment affected subjects'
efficacy or activism scores. As is apparent by examining
Tables 3-6, the majority of results are nonsignificant.
Significant and marginally significant results are
discussed below.
Implicit Action Efficacy ScnrPs
. Condition effects on
the implicit action efficacy scores are presented in Table
3. The highly significant beliefs condition main effect
revealed that higher levels of implicit action efficacy
were reported by subjects in the impersonal beliefs versus
the personal beliefs condition. As might be expected,
subjects agreed more strongly with statements expressing
the possibility of having an influence in the abstract than
with statements expressing the possibility that they
themselves could have an influence. This effect was
qualified by a significant Efficacy Condition X Belief
Condition interaction. Simple effects analyses revealed
marginally greater F(l,190) = 2.93, p < .09, self-reported
political efficacy (M = 3.90) versus issue-specific
efficacy (M = 3.74) for subjects in the impersonal beliefs
condition, but a nonsignificant, F(l,190) = 2.19, p < .15
trend in the opposite direction for subjects in the
personal beliefs condition (M = 3.30 for political
efficacy, M = 3.47 for issue-specific efficacy). A
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Table 3
Condition Effects: Implicit Action Efficacy
Source of
Variation
Main Effects
Efficacy
Belief
Order
Issue
2-way Interactions
Efficacy Belief
Efficacy Order
Efficacy Issue
Belief Order
Belief Issue
Order Issue
3-way Interactions
Efficacy Belief Order
Efficacy Belief Issue
Efficacy Order Issue
Belief Order Issue
4-way Interactions
Explained
Residual
Total
Sum of
Srnia r& ou^u i Dr
Mean
Square F P
20.850 5 4. 170 8.023
. 000
.005 1
. 005 .010 .919
18 ?1 ft iX lo . 218 35.051
. 000
.067 1 .067
. 130 .719
2.546 2 1.273 2.449
. 088
3 750 Q
. 4 17
. 802
. 615
2.544 1 2.544 4.894
. 028
.117 1
. 117 .225 .636
.988 2 .494 .950
. 388
. 019 1
. 019
. 036 .850
c r\ o t
. 072 .931
.013 2
. 007 .013 .987
4.498 7
. 643 1.236 .282
t Uj j iX n c c
. Odd . 105 . 746
. 122 2 .061
. 117 .889
2 . 156 4.148 . 017
.004 2 .002 .004 .996
1.751 2 .876 1.685 . 187
31. 127 23 1. 353 2.604 . 000
190.232 366 .520
221. 360 389 .569
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marginally significant
(B < . 09 ) issue condition main
effect also emerged. Inspection of the means revealed
higher implicit action efficacy when subjects completed the
environmental activism scale (M = 3.71) than when they
completed either nuclear or U Mass activism scales (both Ms
= 3.54). Note that the political and issue-specific
efficacy scores are combined in the issue condition main
effect analysis. When only the issue-specific efficacy
scores were analyzed (see "Reliabilities and Mean Scores"
section), the issue condition main effect was significant,
with differences between mean scores exhibiting the same
pattern as when the issue-specific and political efficacy
scores were analyzed together. However, this effect was
qualified by an uninterpretable 3-way Issue Condition X
Efficacy Condition X Order interaction.
Explicit Action Efficacy Scores . Condition effects on
the explicit action efficacy scores are presented in Table
4. A significant beliefs main effect also resulted for the
explicit action efficacy scores, again revealing greater
efficacy reported in the impersonal versus personal beliefs
condition. This effect was not qualified by any
interactions. Neither the efficacy condition nor the issue
condition main effects were significant (both ps > .10);
however, a significant Efficacy Condition X Issue Condition
interaction did emerge. Simple effects analyses revealed
that the interaction was accounted for by significantly
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Table 4
Condition Effects: Explicit Action Efficacy
^"fce °f Sum of MeanVariation Squares DF Square
Main Effects
Efficacy
Belief
Order
Issue
2-way Interactions
Efficacy Belief
Efficacy Order
Efficacy Issue
Belief Order
Belief Issue
Order Issue
3
-
way Interactions
Efficacy Belief Order
Efficacy Belief Issue
Efficacy Order Issue
Belief Order Issue
4-way Interactions
Explained
Residual
Total
3.496 5
. 699 2 . 169
.459 1 .459 1 .424 234
1.777 1 1.777 5. 513
. 019
.099 1 .099
. 306
. 580
1. 134 2 .567 1.759
. 174
3.581 9
. 398 1.235 .272
. D J 1 1
. 531 1. 648 .200
. 196 1
. 196
. 608 .436
0 *> a q1 . JOO *->2 1 . 184 3 . 673
. 026
.012 1
. 012 .038 .846
. 4o2 2
. 231 .716 .489
.027 2 .014
. 043 . 958
1.856 1 .265 .822 .569
.233 1 .233 .723 .396
.530 2 .265 .822 .442
.615 2 .307 .954 .386
.493 2 .247 .765 .466
1.573 2 .787 2.440 .089
10.500 23 .457 1.416 .098
117.965 366 . 322
128.465 389 .330
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higher, £(1,128) = 12.26, B < .001, environmental efficacy
(M = 3.64) verses political efficacy (M = 3.36); the
difference between issue-specific and political efficacy
was not significant for either nuclear war, F(l,l28) =
.51,
B > -40, or U Mass, £(1,128) =
.013, p_ > .90). Finally, a
marginally significant (E < .09) but uninterpretable
Efficacy Condition X Beliefs Condition X Order Condition X
Issue Condition 4-way interaction was found. No other
effects on either the implicit or explicit action scores
were significant or marginally significant.
Issue-specific Activism. Condition effects on the
issue-specific activism scores are presented in Table 5. A
marginally significant efficacy condition main effect was
found (p_ < .07) indicating that more issue-specific
activism was reported by subjects in the issue-specific
versus political efficacy condition. This effect was
qualified by a significant Efficacy Condition X Belief
Condition interaction. Simple effects analyses revealed
marginally greater, F(l,190) = 3.78, p < .06, issue-
specific activism in the personal vs. impersonal issue-
specific efficacy condition (Ms = 1.67 and 1.51
respectively), but marginally less, F(l,196) = 3.49, p <
.07, issue-specific activism in the personal vs. impersonal
political efficacy condition (Ms = 1.44 and 1.56
respectively) . Finally, a marginally significant, (p <
.06) Belief Condition X Order Condition interaction was
Table 5
Condition Effects: Issue-specific Activism
Source of
Variation
Sum of Mean
Main Effects
Efficacy
Belief
Order
Issue
2-way Interactions
Efficacy Belief
Efficacy Order
Efficacy Issue
Belief Order
Belief Issue
Order Issue
3-way Interactions
Efficacy Belief Order
Efficacy Belief Issue
Efficacy Order Issue
Belief Order Issue
4-way Interactions
Explained
Residual
Total
Squares DF Square F
6.611 5 1. 322 5 . 583 000
.821 1 .821 3.465 .063
• \) Z H 1
. 024
. 101 .751
.046 1 .046
. 196 .658
5.724 2 2.862 12 . 085
. 000
5.773 9 .641 2 .709
. 005
1.856 1 1.856 7.835
. 005QQQ 1 .999 4 . 217 .041
1.046 2
. 523 2 . 209
. Ill
q <^ n 1 .850 3 . 591
. 059
. 345 2
. 173 .729 .483
7 9 1 Z .3 60 1 . 522 . 220
1 O Q /
J. • Z O H /
. 183
. 774 . 609
.008 1 .008
. 032 .859
. 542 2 .271 1. 145 .319
. 515 2 .257 1.087
. 338
.209 2 . 105 .442 .643
.819 2 .410 1.730 . 179
14.59 23 .635 2 . 680 . 000
86. 676 366 .237
.01.271 389 .260
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also found. This interaction was accounted for by two
nonsignificant, but opposing trends: when the efficacy
items were presented first, subjects reported greater
issue-specific activism in the personal (M = 1.58) versus
impersonal (M
- 1.48) beliefs condition, F(l,193) = 2.31, p
> .10; however, when the behavior items were presented
first, subjects reported greater issue-specific activism in
the impersonal condition (Ms = 1.59 and 1.51), F( 1,193) =
1.07, p = .30. 3
Political Activism. Since only subjects in the
political efficacy conditions responded to the political
activism items, Efficacy Condition could not be entered
into the analyses. Thus, a Beliefs Condition X Order
Condition X Issue Condition 3-way analysis of variance was
performed (see Table 6) . Only a main effect for Belief
Condition was found such that higher levels of activism
were reported by subjects in the impersonal (M = 1.92)
versus the personal (M - 1.72) beliefs condition. No other
significant or marginally significant effects on either the
issue-specific or political activism scores were found (all
ps > . 10)
.
As already discussed, (see "Reliabilities and Mean Scores"
section) , levels of self-reported activism differed across
issues, with significantly less antinuclear activism than either
environmental or U Mass activism. This main effect for issue
condition was also highly significant in 4-way ANOVA, F(2,366) =
12.09, p < .001.
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Table 6
Condition Effects: Political Activism
Source of
Variation
Main Effects
Belief
Order
Issue
2-way Interactions
Belief Order
Belief Issue
Order Issue
3-way Interaction
Explained
Residual
Total
Sum of
Squares DF
Mean
Square F n
tr
2.671 4
. 668 2.439 .049
l Qsn J. 1 . 950 7 . 124
. 008
.488 1 .488 1.781
. 184
S> 4
• *I D o£ .12 3 .450
. 639
D
. 215
. 787
. 560
.438 1 .438 1. 601
. 207
.504 2 .252 .921 .400
. 130 2 .065 .237 .790
.574 2 .287 1.048 .353
4.289 11
. 390 1.424
. 165
50. 646 185 .274
54 .934 196
. 280
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Summary of Condition Efferts
. As is apparent by
examining mean differences and degrees of freedom, most
condition effects are small in magnitude, but often reach
significance because of the large sample sizes, with the
exception of the higher levels of impersonal versus
personal efficacy, and the differences between issues in
levels of self-reported activism (see above)
, these effects
are of little theoretical significance, and shed little
interpretive light upon the data. Presentation order had
minimal effects on either the efficacy or activism scores
and, therefore, was not included as a factor in any
subsequent analyses.
Correlations and Regressions
Overview of analyses. Standardized efficacy and
activism scores were computed within each issue condition
so that differences in mean scores between issues would not
affect the results when efficacy-activism correlations were
computed across the three issues. The efficacy-activism
relation was examined by utilizing a forced-entry
hierarchical regression model. Efficacy condition, belief
condition, and efficacy score were entered as predictor
variables of the dependent measure, activism score. Dummy
coding was used to represent the two efficacy conditions (1
= political efficacy, -1 = issue-specific efficacy) , and
the two belief conditions (1 = personal beliefs, -1 =
impersonal beliefs) . Efficacy Condition X Efficacy Score
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crossproduct terms were computed and used to test for
efficacy main effects on the efficacy-activism relation;
Belief Condition X Efficacy Score crossproduct terms were
computed and used to test for belief condition main effects
on the efficacy-activism relation. For example, an
efficacy main effect (a difference in the strength of the
correlation between efficacy and issue-specific activism)
was tested by entering efficacy condition (E)
,
efficacy
score (S)
,
and lastly, the Efficacy Condition X Efficacy
Score crossproduct term (ES) into the regression equation
with issue-specific activism (Y) as the dependent measure.
A significant increase in the amount of variance accounted
for by the crossproduct term over and above that accounted
for by efficacy condition and efficacy score alone
indicates a significant main effect for political vs.
issue-specific efficacy. An Efficacy Condition X Belief
Condition X Efficacy Score crossproduct term (EB)S was
calculated and used to test for interaction effects between
political vs. issue-specific efficacy and personal vs.
impersonal beliefs (see Cohen, 1978). In this analysis,
efficacy condition (E) , belief condition (B)
,
efficacy
score (S) , the Efficacy Condition X Efficacy Score
crossproduct term (ES) , Belief Condition by Efficacy Score
crossproduct term (BS) , and the Efficacy Condition by
Belief Condition crossproduct term (EB) are all entered as
predictor variables before the Efficacy Condition X Belief
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Condition X Efficacy Score (EB)S crossproduct term. if the
addition of (EB)S significantly improves the efficacy-
activism relation, the interaction is significant. All
analyses were conducted using the SPSS-X statistical
package
.
Implicit and Explicit Action v.ffi^y Responses to
the 5-item implicit action efficacy scale and 16-item
explicit action efficacy scales were moderately to highly
intercorrelated. (Recall that all subjects completed both
types of scales.) Averaging across issues, the
correlations between the two scales in the four cells of
the design—political efficacy-personal beliefs, political
efficacy-impersonal beliefs, issue-specific efficacy-
personal beliefs, and issue-specific efficacy-impersonal
beliefs—were
.53, .60, .70, and .51 respectively. Because
the two scales were intercorrelated, a pooled scale (which
shall be referred to as such) was also constructed.
Subsequent analyses were conducted on the implicit action
scale, explicit action scale, and on the pooled scale.
Hypotheses Tests: Effects of Efficacy and Belief Type
Across Issues Analyses . Correlations between the
efficacy and activism scales for the four efficacy and
belief type combinations are presented in Table 7. Mean
issue-specific efficacy and activism scores were computed
by averaging across the efficacy and activism scores for
the three issues. With the exception of the implicit
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action-impersonal beliefs issue-specific efficacy scale,
all efficacy-activism correlations were significant beyond
the .05 level.
Issue-specific activism was predicted to be more
strongly related to issue-specific efficacy than to
political efficacy. This effect was significant for the
explicit action efficacy scale, F(l,386) = 6.27, p_ < .05,
and for the pooled scale, F(l,386) = 4.46., p < .05, but
not for the implicit action scale, F(l,386) =
.61, p > .40.
A similar pattern of results was found for the beliefs
prediction: personal beliefs correlated more highly with
issue-specific activism than impersonal beliefs when
efficacy scores were obtained utilizing the explicit action
scale, F(l,386) = 5.54, p < .05, the pooled scale, F(l,386)
= 4.01, p < .05, but not the implicit action scale,
F(l,386) = 1.16, p > .20. Thus, across issues, both
predicted main effects were significant when efficacy was
measured at a level compatible with the activism measure,
but not when efficacy was measured at a more general level.
The Efficacy X Beliefs interaction was significant for
the implicit action efficacy scale, F(l,382) = 4.95, p <
.03, but only approached significance for the explicit
action scale, F(l,382) = 2.56, p < .12, and the pooled
scale, F( 1,382) = 2.82, p < .10. Although no interaction
was predicted, I had suspected that the political efficacy-
issue activism relation might be so weak that the beliefs
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manipulation would have little effect and, therefore, that
personal beliefs might correlate more highly with issue-
specific activism than would impersonal beliefs, but only
for issue-specific efficacy. simple effects analyses
supported this reasoning. For political efficacy, the
beliefs simple effect was nonsignificant, F(l,i94) = 1.33,
fi > -20, £(1,194) = .00, p > .90, and £(1,194) =
.05, p >
.80 for the implicit action, explicit action, and pooled
scales respectively. For issue-specific efficacy, however,
the beliefs simple effect was significant for all three
scales: F(l,194) = 4.02, F(l,194) = 5.03, F(l,194) = 4.45,
all ps < .05. (For ease of presentation, results involving
the implicit action, explicit action, and pooled scales are
always presented in that order unless otherwise noted.)
Efficacy simple effects were also analyzed. Since the
efficacy-activism relation for impersonal beliefs was
relatively weak, one might predict a significant efficacy
simple effect only when the items are framed as personal
beliefs. Again, the analyses supported this reasoning: In
comparison to political efficacy, issue-specific efficacy
was more highly correlated with issue-specific activism
when the efficacy statements were framed personally,
F(l,194) = 4.71, p < .05, F(l,194) = 7.35, p < .01,
F( 1,194) = 6.76, p < .01, but not when framed impersonally,
F(l,194) = 1.25, p > .20, F(l,194) = .40, p > .50, F(l,194)
=
.08, p > .70.
:s were
Across issues then, both predicted main effect*
significant for the explicit action and pooled scales, but
not the implicit action scale. However, simple effects
analyses yielded significant results in the predicted
directions for all three scales, clearly, efficacy type
and belief type are important moderators of the efficacy-
activism relation. A stronger efficacy-activism relation
is obtained when efficacy and activism are assessed with
compatible measures, that is, when the efficacy statements
are specific to the issue, and when they are framed at the
personal level. Thus far, however, only analyses conducted
on across-issues, issue-specific efficacy and activism
scores have been presented; we now turn to the results of
analyses performed on each of the three issues separately.
Nuclear War. The effect of efficacy type on the
efficacy-activism relation for nuclear war was similar to
that obtained across issues: nuclear efficacy was more
strongly related to nuclear activism when the efficacy-
activism relation was tested using the explicit action
scale, F(l,126) = 7.42, p < .01, and the pooled scale,
F( 1,126) = 7.31, p_ < .01; only a marginal trend in the
predicted direction emerged for the implicit action scale,
F(l,126) = 2.88, p_ = .09.
While the beliefs main effect was nonsignificant (all
p_s > .10), the Efficacy X Beliefs interaction was
significant for all three scales, F(l,126) = 4.02, F(l,126)
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= 5.03, F(l,126)
- 4.22, all ps <
.05. simple effects
analyses also yielded results similar to those found in the
across issues analyses. The beliefs simple effect was not
significant in the political efficacy condition (all ps >
.20); however, in the nuclear efficacy condition the
beliefs simple effect was significant for the implicit
action scale, £(1,126) = 3.29, p < . 05
, and marginally
significant for the explicit action, £(1,126) = 3.90, p <
.06, and pooled scales, F(l,l26) = 3.28, p < .08.
Interestingly, the efficacy simple effect was much more
pronounced: nuclear efficacy was more strongly related to
nuclear activism than was political efficacy when the
efficacy statements were framed personally, F(l,l26) =
8.75, p < .01, F(l,126) = 12.19, p < .001, F(l,126) =
11.81, p < .01, but there was no difference at all when the
efficacy items were framed impersonally (all ps > .80).
Thus, the belief that it is possible in the abstract to
reduce the threat of nuclear war does not predict
antinuclear activism any better than the belief that it is
possible to influence the government. However, the belief
that one personally can influence the government does not
predict antinuclear activism nearly as well as the belief
that one personally can reduce the threat of nuclear war.
The Environment
. A significant efficacy main effect
in the predicted direction was again obtained for the
explicit action scale, F(l,126) = 7.63, p < .01, and the
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pooled scale, F(1,126) = 5.65, B < . 05/ but not the
implicit action scale, F(1,126) =
.70, B > .40. The
beliefs main effect was again nonsignificant, F(l,i 2 6) =
•00, p_ > .90, F(l,126) = 1. 18| E > . 2Qf £(lfl26) = ^ e >
.30; however, there was no hint of a Efficacy X Beliefs
interaction (all ps > .70). An unexpected simple effect
did emerge such that environmental efficacy predicted
environmental activism better than did political efficacy
when the efficacy beliefs were framed impersonally. This
effect was significant for the implicit action scale,
F(1,126) = 5.79, p < .05, and the pooled scale, £(1,126) =
4.40, p < .05, but not the explicit action scale, F(l,l26)
=
.10, p > .70.
The University of Massachusetts Financial sil-n^i-inn
Neither the efficacy or beliefs main effects, nor the
Efficacy X Beliefs interaction were significant (all ps >
.10). The absence of a significant efficacy main effect
makes sense in light of the fact that the U Mass financial
situation is an inherently political issue. Unlike the
state of the environment, and to some extent the threat of
nuclear war, one can only hope to improve the financial
situation of a large state university by influencing the
political system in some respect. Interestingly, and
counter to predictions, the efficacy-activism relation
tended to be stronger for political efficacy rather than U
Mass efficacy (see Table 7) . No efficacy or belief simple
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effects approached significance with the exception of an
unexpected marginally significant Z(1#126) = 3.66, E < .07,
efficacy simple effect such that the efficacy-activism
relation, as measured by the implicit action scale, was
stronger for political efficacy than for U Mass efficacy
when the items were framed as personal beliefs. No other
simple effects were significant or marginally significant
(all p_s >
.10) .
Political Activism
. since no questionnaires contained
both issue-specific efficacy and general political activism
items, only the beliefs main effect could be examined.
Since issue-specific activism was irrelevant in this
analysis, political behavior scores were pooled across the
three issue conditions. The beliefs main effect was
significant for the explicit action scale, F(l,193) = 7.02,
E < .01, and the pooled scale, F(l,193) = 6.35, p < .05,
but not the implicit action scale F(l,l93) = 2.46, p > .10.
Examination of the efficacy-activism correlations revealed
that impersonal beliefs were more highly correlated with
political activism than personal beliefs (see Table 7) .
Interestingly, the belief that it is possible to influence
the government and the political system was a stronger
predictor of political activism than the belief that one
personally can do so.
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Table 7
Pearson Correlations: Efficacy and Activism
Nuke Envir u Mass Mean i-s Pol
Note: Nuke = Antinuclear activism Envir = Environmental
activism U Mass = u Mass activism Mean I-S = AverageIssue-specific activism Pol = Political activism. PPE =Personal Political Efficacy IPE = Impersonal PoliticalEfficacy pie = Personal Issue-specific Efficacy HE =
Impersonal Issue-specific Efficacy IA = Implicit ActionEfficacy (5 item scale) EA = Explicit Action Efficacy (16item scale)
. Correlations in the PPE, IPE, PIE, and HE
rows were computed by pooling responses to the implicit
action and explicit action efficacy items. For each issue,
n - 34 for the PPE condition, n = 32 for the three
remaining conditions. Across issues, n = 102 for the PPE
condition, n = 96 for the three remaining conditions. For
political behavior, n = 101 for the PPE condition, n = 96
for the IPE condition.
* p_ < .05 ** p_ < .01 *** p < .001 two-tailed.
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Factor Analyspg
Exploratory principle components analyses were
performed on all 16-item explicit action efficacy scales
and on the activism scales. m all cases one main factor
emerged that typically accounted for approximately 30% to
50% of the variance. Although other factors had
eigenvalues greater than one, they typically accounted for
only 7% to 10% of the variance, and an examination of the
items revealed no clear interpretations of these factors.
These results are not surprising given the high
reliabilities of the scales, since only one factor
accounted for a meaningful portion of the variance, no
additional analyses were performed.
Other Variables
Data were collected for the following discrete
variables: subjects' political party identification
(Democrat, n = 120, Republican, n = 60, or Independent, n
= 101)
,
voting behavior in the last presidential election
(voted, n = 214, or did not vote, n = 174), and voter
registration status (registered, n = 319, or not
registered, n = 70) . Separate 2-way ANOVAS—Political
Party X Issue Condition, Voting Behavior X Issue Condition,
and Registration Status X Issue Condition, as well as
Gender X Issue Condition—were conducted to determine if
these factors influenced levels of issue-specific and
political activism. None of the 2-way interactions were
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significant or marginally significant (all pS > . 10) .
Since issue condition main effects were discussed
previously (see the "Reliabilities and Mean Scores" and
"Condition Effects" sections above)
,
only the political
party identification, voting behavior, registration status,
and gender main effects are addressed here.
Neither levels of issue-specific nor political
activism varied significantly by political party
identification. However, when only Democrats and
Republicans were compared, marginally greater £(1,178) =
3.72, p < .06, issue-specific activism was found for
Democrats (M = 1.63) versus Republicans (M = 1.47). This
difference was not found for any one of the issues examined
separately (all ps > .10), due, most likely, to the
decreased sample size. Political activism did not vary
significantly by political party identification (all ps >
.10) .
Having voted in the last presidential election was
significantly related to average levels of self-reported
issue-specific activism, F(l,382) = 9.40, p < .01, and
political activism, F(l,191) = 14.79, p < .001, with voters
reporting greater activism than nonvoters (Ms = 1.63 and
1.44 for issue-specific activism, Ms = 1.95 and 1.65 for
political activism)
. Since one of the activism items was
voting for a candidate, the analyses were recomputed with
this item dropped. While mean differences between voters
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and nonvoters were slightly reduced (Ms = 1. 63 and 1.44 for
issue-specific activism, Ms = 1.95 and 1.65 for political
activism), the results were still significant, F(l,382) =
6.96, p < .01, F(l,191) = 11. 18| E < , 001# for issue_
specific and political activism respectively. Individual
issue analyses yielded a significant difference in the same
direction for nuclear war when the voting behavior item was
retained, F(l,l28) = 4.43, p < .05, and a marginally
significant difference when the item was dropped, F(1,128)
= 3.87, p < .06. The only other issue for which voting
approached significance was U Mass F( 1,128) = 3.31, E <
.08. When the voting behavior item was dropped, however,
the effect was no longer marginally significant (p > .15).
Significantly greater issue-specific activism (Ms =
1.85, 1.63), F(l, 383) = 4.33, p < .05, and political
activism, (Ms = 1.57, 1.44), £(1,191) = 4.44, p < .05, was
found for those registered versus not registered to vote.
The effect was only marginally significant, F(l,383) =
3.06, p < .09, for issue-specific activism and
nonsignificant, F(l,l91) = 2.63, p >.lo, for political
activism when the voting item was dropped from the
analyses. Separate issue analyses revealed a significant
difference only for U Mass activism. Registered voters
reported significantly higher levels of activism when the
voting behavior item was retained (Ms ^ 1.73 and 1.40),
F( 1,128) = 7.01, p < .01, and when it was dropped (Ms =
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1.70 and 1.41), F(l,i28 ) = 5 . 80
, g < . 05 from the analysis.
Voter registration status was not significantly related to
the environment
(Es > .10) or nuclear war (ps >
. 80 ).
These results complement the finding that political
efficacy and U Mass efficacy predict U Mass activism about
equally. since the financial situation at U Mass is an
inherently political issue, one would expect activism to be
associated with behaviors intended to influence the
political system itself, such as registering to vote.
While voting in the last presidential election was not
significantly related to U Mass activism, the financial
situation at U Mass is largely perceived as resulting from
the state's financial crisis; vote casting at the national
level may be viewed as ineffective. When one registers to
vote, however, one is then able to take part in state,
local, and national elections, some of which bear directly
on the U Mass financial situation.
Gender did not significantly relate to either issue-
specific F(l,386) = 2.49, p > .10, or political activism
F( 1,194) = .09, p > .70. When each issue was analyzed
separately, gender was found to be significantly related
only to U Mass activism, with females reporting
significantly higher, F(l,128) = 4.02, p < .05 levels of
activism than males (Ms = 1.74 and 1.54 respectively).
Pearson correlations were computed between activism
and three continuous variables: age, issue importance, and
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liberalism, (see Table 8.) All three variables were
positively correlated with both average issue-specific
efficacy and political efficacy. Age was significantly
correlated with antinuclear (r «
.57) and environmental
activism (r = .29), but not U Mass activism (r =
.12). The
notably high correlation between age and antinuclear
activism most likely reflects the decreased salience of the
issue among younger students. The lack of a significant
relation between age and U Mass activism supports this
interpretation since the issue is, at present, especially
salient. Issue importance was positively correlated with
activism for all three issues (rs =
.33, .21, and .38 for
nuclear war, the environment, and U Mass respectively)
.
Liberalism was positively correlated with antinuclear (r =
.42) and U Mass activism (r =
.36), but was unrelated to
environmental activism (r =
-.02).
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Table 8
Pearson Correlations: Age Liberalism, Xssue l»portance
witn Activism
Variable Nuke Envir u Mass Mean i-s Pol.
Age
Importance
Liberalism
.
57***
.
33***
.
42***
29***
21*
02
12
38***
36***
.25***
.
34***
.
36***
.
23***
. 14*
.17*
?hat
S
the
m
thr^Co/ re?P°nse to "How important is it to yout hreat f nuclear war be reduced/the quality ofthe environment be improved/the financial situation at UMass be improved?" (i = very important 5 = not at ll1
ih^flUt)- Liberalism = response to "How wSuld youcharacterize you own political views?" (i = very liberal 5
;or^Lh°?SerVatiVe) n B°th items were reversed^cored?F each issue sample sizes ranged from 127 to 130 (due tooccasional missing values)
. Across issues, n = 389 for
For' r>n^+
3
£li
f0r
^
SSUe imPortance
* " = 384 for liberalism.political activism, n = 197 for age and issueimportance, n = 194 for liberalism.
* p_ < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 two-tailed.
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The results of this study have both theoretical and
applied value. Theoretically, they provide support for the
predictions of the compatibility principle, that stronger
correlations between two indicators of a disposition will
result when these indicators are assessed at a
corresponding level. We predicted that a stronger
efficacy-activism relation would result when the efficacy
statements referred specifically to the issue under
consideration rather than to the government in general, and
when they were framed personally rather than impersonally.
Generally, the results support both predictions. Across
issues, both hypothesized main effects were significant:
Issue-specific efficacy predicted socio-political activism
better than did political activism, and personal beliefs
predicted socio-political activism better than impersonal
beliefs.
When the issues were examined individually, thereby
utilizing only one-third of the sample in each analysis (n
= 130)
,
the efficacy main effect was significant for both
antinuclear war and the environmental activism. The effect
was not significant for activism designed to improve the U
Mass financial situation as the types of behaviors that
could potentially have an impact are political in nature.
The beliefs main effect, however, was nonsignificant for
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each of the three issues. Although the trends were in the
expected direction for nuclear war and the environment, the
belief that one personally can have an influence did not
predict activism significantly better than the belief that
it is possible in the abstract to have an influence.
Apparently then, the personal vs. impersonal beliefs
distinction is more tenuous than the distinction between
issue-specific and political efficacy; however, the overall
difference for the main effects will be qualified below.
Both the efficacy type and belief type variables were
more powerful moderators of the efficacy-activism relation
when efficacy was measured by the 16-item explicit action
scale that assessed the perceived effectiveness of
performing the specific types of behaviors composing the
activism measure, than when efficacy was measured by the 5-
item implicit action scale that assessed the perceived
effectiveness of performing activist behaviors in general.
Across issues, both the efficacy and belief main effects
were significant for the explicit action scale, the pooled
implicit and explicit action scale, but not the implicit
action scale alone. A similar pattern resulted for the
efficacy main effect for nuclear war and the environment.
It appears, then, that the implicit action measure—the
type of efficacy measure used in the majority of
investigations of the efficacy-activism relation—is not as
sensitive to the issue-specific versus political efficacy,
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and personal versus impersonal beliefs distinctions, as is
the explicit action measure.
Interestingly, however, the Efficacy X Beliefs
interaction was significant for the implicit action scale,
but only approached significance for explicit action and
pooled scales in the across issues analysis, and was
significant for all three scales when nuclear war was
examined. The interaction, however, was nonsignificant for
improving the quality of the environment and improving the
U Mass financial situation. simple effects analyses on the
across issues and nuclear war Efficacy X Beliefs
interactions (see "Hypotheses Tests" section), revealed
that issue-specific efficacy predicted issue-specific
activism better than political efficacy only when the
beliefs were framed personally. The efficacy simple effect
was significant or marginally significant for all three
efficacy scales when beliefs were measured at the personal
level, and nonsignificant for all three efficacy scales
when beliefs were measured at the impersonal level.
Similarly, personal beliefs predicted issue-specific
activism significantly better than did impersonal beliefs
only when efficacy was measured at the issue-specific
level; the effect was nonsignificant for all three efficacy
scales when efficacy was measured at the more general,
political level.
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Thus, the fact that the efficacy and belief main
effects were significant for the explicit action but not
the implicit action scale results because political
efficacy and impersonal beliefs are such weak predictors of
socio-political activism; the beliefs type manipulation had
little effect on political efficacy, and the efficacy type
manipulation had little effect on impersonal beliefs thus
diluting both the efficacy and belief main effects. Across
issues and for nuclear war, at least, the more compatible
measures were clearly the better predictors of socio-
political activism. At present, the majority of studies
that have generated support for the compatibility principle
have investigated the link between attitudes and behavior
(see Ajzen, 1988, Ch. 5, for a review). This study then,
extends the predictions of the compatibility principle to
the domain of perceived efficacy (see also Ajzen & Timko,
1986)
,
therefore attesting to the generality of the
compatibility principle.
Since there is very little literature on the
distinction between personal and impersonal beliefs, these
results are of particular interest. The compatibility
principle would predict that personal beliefs should be
more highly correlated with activist behavior than
impersonal beliefs because the subjects are asked to
indicate how often they themselves have performed each of
the activist behaviors. Indeed, Ajzen (1988) argues that
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in order to obtain a strong attitude-behavior relation,
attitudes must be assessed at the personal level. Bandura
(1977, 1982) has reported high correlations between
personal efficacy beliefs regarding performing a behavior
and actual behavioral performance in a number of behavioral
domains
.
.sm
In the across issues and general political activi;
analyses, efficacy statements framed as personal beliefs
correlated more highly with activism than did impersonal
beliefs when efficacy was measured by the explicit action
and pooled scales. Thus, the belief that one can
personally have an influence in the socio-political realm
predicts socio-political activism better than the belief
that it is possible in the abstract to have an influence.
Admittedly, relatively large sample sizes were required for
this effect to reach significance (n = 198 for political
activism, n = 390 for issue-specific activism) . However,
with the exception of the Fishbein (1979) study, this is
the first empirical demonstration that personal beliefs
predict behavior better than impersonal beliefs. Since
Fishbein measured beliefs about cigarette smoking and was
concerned with the attitude-behavior relation, this study
not only lends support to Fishbein' s distinction, but also
extends it to the realm of socio-political activism.
In addition to supporting and extending the
predictions of the compatibility principle, the results of
59
this study have a variety of implications for research
investigating the efficacy-activism relation. in the
nuclear war literature for example, two studies that
measured both political efficacy and nuclear efficacy (Fox
& Schofield, 1989; Tyler & McGraw, 1983) found a stronger
relationship between nuclear efficacy and nuclear activism
than between political efficacy and political activism.
Neither study, however, directly compared the strength of
these relations. By utilizing the regression model, it was
possible in the present study to directly test for a
significant difference between these relations. While the
efficacy main effect was not significant when efficacy was
measured by the implicit action scales—the scales
comparable to those used in the above studies, the trends
were in the predicted direction. Moreover, the Efficacy X
Beliefs Interaction was significant as nuclear efficacy
predicted nuclear activism better than political efficacy
when the efficacy items were framed personally (p < .01)
but not impersonally (p > .80). Therefore, this study
demonstrates that when efficacy is measured at the personal
level, nuclear efficacy is indeed a better predictor of
nuclear activism than is political efficacy.
Thus, these results support the conclusion that
researchers and others who are interested in predicting
activism for a particular issue from perceptions of
efficacy should focus on peoples* perceptions of their own
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.ssue .
se
ability to have an influence on that particular- i.
While some activism researchers do seem to recognize
importance of assessing efficacy beliefs at the issue-
specific level, the importance of assessing efficacy
beliefs at the personal level may not be recognized.
Hopefully, this study will serve to make researchers in the
field aware of the importance of this distinction.
It should be noted, however, that the distinctions
between issue-specific efficacy versus political efficacy
and personal beliefs versus impersonal beliefs were not
equally important for all issues. While the efficacy type
main effect was significant for the environment when
efficacy was measured by the explicit action and pooled
scales, no other main or interaction effects were
significant for the environment, and none at all for the U
Mass financial situation. The trends were in the predicted
direction for both the efficacy and belief main effects for
the environment; with a larger sample size both predicted
main effects may well have reached significance. For the U
Mass financial situation, however, while personal beliefs
tended to be more strongly related to U Mass activism than
impersonal beliefs, contrary to expectations, political
efficacy tended to be more strongly related to U Mass
activism than was U Mass efficacy. Apparently, the issue-
specific measure was simply redundant and did not improve,
and even tended to diminish, the efficacy-activism
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relation. Thus, there may be no advantage to be gained by
assessing efficacy that is specific to the issue when the
issue itself is inherently political.
The factor analyses were performed to examine other
possible dimensions of efficacy and activism. As noted in
the introduction, McKenzie and Dyal (1988) suggested a
distinction between conventional and unconventional forms
of activism, it is also possible that activist behaviors
taken within existing political channels might fall on a
different dimension than those taken outside such channels.
While the principle components analyses did not yield
factors that could be clearly interpreted along these or
any other dimensions, these results do not suggest that
either distinction is invalid, because this study was not
designed to adequately test the importance of these
distinctions. Few of the items used in this study would be
classified by McKenzie and Dyal as measuring conventional
or "soft core" activism, which they define as activities
related to increasing awareness about an issue. And while
the within versus outside existing political channels
distinction may be intuitively appealing, few efficacy
beliefs or activist behaviors are clearly of one type but
not the other. One could reasonably argue that all of the
activism and explicit action efficacy items used in this
study (with the possible exception of wearing a button or
shirt that expresses a particular view) describe activist
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behaviors designed to influence the existing political
network. Thus, additional research that is designed
specifically to examine the utility of these and other
distinctions is needed.
The positive correlation between liberalism and
antinuclear activism confirms the findings of many previous
investigations (McKenzie & Dyal, 1988; Oskamp et al., 1985;
Tyler & McGraw, 1983; Watanabe & Milburn, 1988; cf. Fiske
et al., 1983). Liberalism also correlated positively with
activism to improve the financial situation at U Mass, but
was unrelated to environmental activism. The latter result
is consistent with recent poll data that indicates that the
current environmental movement, unlike that of the early
seventies, is broad based. Approximately 75% of the U.S.
public identify themselves as environmentalists, with
little variation across demographic lines (Gallup Poll,
1989; Gallup & Newport, 1990).
However, even though liberalism was uncorrelated with
environmental activism, it was significantly correlated
with the across issues issue-specific activism (r = .36),
as well as with scores on the political activism measure (r
=
.17). Although slightly greater activism was found for
Democrats versus Republicans when levels of activism were
averaged across issues, this marginally significant result
was nonsignificant for each issue when examined separately,
and for political activism in general. Thus, it appears
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that political view (i.e, liberalism, moderate,
conservatism) is more strongly related to socio-political
activism than is political party identification.
Voting in the last presidential election also
correlated positively with average issue-specific activism
and political activism, as did being registered to vote,
although the relationships were more tenuous. While voting
was associated with antinuclear war activism, and
registration was associated with U Mass activism, neither
variable correlated significantly with any other issue.
Since only voting in the previous presidential election was
assessed, it is likely that the relationship between voting
and activism would have been stronger had a more
representative measure of past voting behavior been
utilized.
Gender was significantly correlated only with U Mass
activism, with females engaging in more activism than
males. Age, however, was positively correlated with all
measures of activism, except U Mass activism. Most likely,
the financial problems at U Mass have not been salient long
enough for age to be a factor. Finally, issue importance
was positively correlated with all measures of activism
without exception. Not surprisingly, those who feel that
it is important that something be done about a particular
issue engage in more activism than those who feel that it
is relatively unimportant that something be done.
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Overall then, liberalism, age, prior voting behavior,
and issue importance appear to be reliable correlates of
socio-political activism. Voter registration status is
also associated with socio-political activism, although the
relationship appears to be relatively weak, of the
variables examined, gender was the least important, with
males and females engaging in roughly equal amounts of
socio-political activism.
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CHPATER 6
CONCLUSION
The results of this study support the predictions of
the compatibility principle and apply these predictions to
the efficacy-activism relation. While this research
directly addresses measurement of the efficacy-activism
relation, it also has implications for those interested in
stimulating socio-political activism. The results of this
study suggest that in order to increase activism with
regard to a specific issue, unless that issue is itself
inherently political in nature, it is important to make
people feel that they have some control over that issue in
particular rather than over the political system in
general. Moreover, the results also imply that it is more
effective to induce the belief that one's own actions can
impact on the issue than it is to induce the belief that
the issue is such that it can be impacted upon in the
abstract.
It should be noted, however, that this study
investigated pre-existing differences in perceptions of
efficacy and levels of socio-political activism. Thus,
while these results suggest which types of efficacy are
most strongly associated with the performance of activist
behaviors, they do not address how to induce perceptions of
efficacy. It is the task of future research to explore
factors that might increase perceptions of efficacy in the
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socio-political realm, and to further explore the efficacy-
activism relation.
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APPENDIX A
PERSONAL POLITICAL EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Action Items
There is little I can do to create political change.
I don't see how I can influence our leaders.
I can influence government policies.
I have no power to influence the political process.
I can change the way things are run in this country.
Explicit Action Ttnmc
I can change the decisions of government by meeting withelected representatives.
W
^i
tin? a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way for me to influence government policies.
I can change government policies by trying to convince
others to adopt a particular political viewpoint.
I can create political change by attending meetings of apolitical organization or group.
It is not possible for me to change the way things are run
in this country by contributing money to a political
organization or political candidate.
By preparing or circulating fliers or handouts, I can
influence government policies.
I can influence government policies by wearing a shirt or
button that expresses a political viewpoint.
I can influence government policies by writing or phoning
public officials.
Getting informed about a political issue can be an
effective way for me to create political change.
By signing petitions, I can help to change the way things
are run in this country.
By working for an activist organization, I can help to
influence the decisions of our leaders.
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I can influence the decisions of our leaders bv t„im
Pro£a»s.°
therS t0 V°te f°r P^ticula/candidateHna9 t0
govern:ent
n
poUc?es?
iCal W°rkSh°P Ca
"
"0t hel? to ^ange
poli?ica? process?
8
**" ^ Uttl6 t0 in"Ue"ce the
POx!?icfi
e
cand5da?e!
itiCal PrOCSSS by
'» a
My attending a rally or demonstration can do little tochange the decisions of our leaders.
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APPENDIX B
IMPERSONAL POLITICAL EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Action Items
Not much can be done to create political change.
It is difficult to influence our leaders.
It is possible to influence government policies.
There is no way to influence the political process.
country?
53^16 t0 the Way things are run in this
Explicit Action Ttpmg
It is possible to change the decisions of government by
meeting with elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way of influencing government policies.
It is possible to change government policies by trying to
convince others to adopt a particular political viewpoint.
It is possible to create political change by attending
meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible to change the way things are run in this
country by contributing money to a political organization
or political candidate.
Preparing or circulating fliers or handouts can influence
government policies.
It is possible to influence government policies by wearing
a shirt or button that expresses a political viewpoint.
It is possible to influence government policies by writing
or phoning public officials.
Getting informed about a political issue can be an
effective way of creating political change.
Signing petitions can help to change the way things are run
in this country.
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APPENDIX C
PERSONAL NUCLEAR EFFICACY ITEMS
Implic it Action Items
L^rt^ z?^^-~ to^— -
of
C
nCclear
t
war
g°Vernment t0 W°rk tOWard reducin9 the threat
a Lavet^tP,°WeLt0 influence the political process in suchway hat would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
I can change the way things are run in this country in sucha way that would help to reduce the threat of nuclear war?
Explicit Action Items
I can reduce the threat of nuclear war by meeting with
elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way for me to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
I can reduce the threat of nuclear war by trying to
convince others to adopt an "anti-nuclear weapons"
viewpoint.
I can reduce the threat of nuclear war by attending
meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible for me to reduce the threat of nuclear
war by contributing money to a political organization or
political candidate.
By preparing or circulating fliers or handouts, I can
reduce the threat of nuclear war.
I can reduce the threat of nuclear war by wearing a shirt
or button that expresses an "anti-nuclear weapons"
viewpoint.
I can reduce the threat of nuclear war by writing or
phoning public officials.
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G
^
tin? informed about nuclear war issues ran haeffectxve way for rae to reduoe the rhrea? oTnSclear war.
nuolelr'wL^""0^' 1 help to reduce the threat of
M?S threX ofnucl^war!^10"' 1 -^ *
I can reduce the threat of nuclear war by tryinq to
tZYiT,t
°therS t0 VOte for "anti-nuclear weapons"candida es or programs. *
My attending a political workshop on nuclear war can nothelp to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
nucIear
n
war?
CiSi°nS ^ d° Uttl* t0 reduce the threat of
L???-
re
f
UCe
^! threat of nucle*r war by working for apolitical candidate who holds "anti-nuclear weapons" views.
My attending a rally or demonstration can do little to
reduce the threat of nuclear war.
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APPENDIX D
IMPERSONAL NUCLEAR EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Action Items
^c?^aPr?litiCal— that™
^^t^SuSj?^ l6aderS t0 ™* h-der to reduce
a
h
w.v
WaLt0 inf1Uence the Poetical process in suchay that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to change the way things are run in this
oHucTea? war
h
*
W*Y **** helP t0 reduce the threat
Explicit Action Items
It is possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war by
meeting with elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way of reducing the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war by
trying to convince others to adopt an "anti-nuclear
weapons" viewpoint.
It is possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war by
attending meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war by
contributing money to a political organization or political
candidate.
Preparing or circulating fliers or handouts can reduce the
threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war by
wearing a shirt or button that expresses an "anti-nuclear
weapons" viewpoint.
It is possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war
by writing or phoning public officials.
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elfec^iv^w^ 3b°Ut . nuclear war iss^s can be anffective way of reducing the threat of nuclear war.
Signing petitions can help to reduce the threat of nuclear
SS^of^Jf °^i-tion can help to reduce the
^jLP?SSible - t0 redUCe the threat of nuclear war bytrying to convince others to vote for "anti-nuclear
weapons" candidates or programs.
Attending a political workshop on nuclear war can not helpto reduce the threat of nuclear war.
Voting can do little to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to reduce the threat of nuclear war by
working for a political candidate who holds "anti-nuclear
weapons" views.
Attending a rally or demonstration can do little to reducethe threat of nuclear war.
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APPENDIX E
PERSONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Actinn Items
L^?eVH? ^ove^nment to work toward improving thequality of the environment. y
a Sr^t^^ influence the political process in suchway that would improve the quality of the environment.
I can change the way things are run in this country in sucha way that would help to improve the quality of the
environment. 2
Explicit Action Items
I can improve the quality of the environment by meeting
with elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way for me to improve the quality of the
environment.
I can improve the quality of the environment by trying to
convince others to adopt a "pro-environmental" viewpoint.
I can improve the quality of the environment by attending
meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible for me to improve the quality of the
environment by contributing money to a political
organization or political candidate.
By preparing or circulating fliers or handouts, I can
improve the quality of the environment.
I can improve the quality of the environment by wearing a
shirt or button that expresses a "pro-environmental"
viewpoint.
I can improve the quality of the environment by writing or
phoning public officials.
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By working for an activist organization, I can helo toimprove the quality of the environment? P
I can improve the quality of the environment by trying to
o^rogra^
erS
^ VOte f°r "P—ironmenta5 Slates
not
a
Jpin
d
f
ng
-
a Political workshop on the environment canhelp to improve the quality of the environment.
My voting decisions can do little to improve the quality ofthe environment. H y
I can improve the quality of the environment by working fora political candidate who holds "pro-environmental" views.
My attending a rally or demonstration can do little toimprove the quality of the environment.
I can improve the quality of the environment by picking up
My boycotting environmentally irresponsible products can
not help to improve the quality of the environment.
Participating in a recycling program can be an effective
way for me to improve the quality of the environment.
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APPENDIX P
IMPERSONAL ENVIRONMENTAL EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Action Items
SU^Si'SSiSr'S S SSSLStT* harder to
It is possible to get the government to work towardimproving the quality of the environment.
Tw^v
WaLt0 influence the political process in sucha way that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is possible to change the way things are run in thiscountry in such a way that would help to improve thequality of the environment.
Explicit Action Items
It is possible to improve the quality of the environment by
meeting with elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way of improving the quality of the environment.
It is possible to improve the quality of the environment by
tryinq to convince others to adopt a "pro-environmental"
viewpoint.
It is possible to improve the quality of the environment by
attending meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible to improve the quality of the
environment by contributing money to a political
organization or political candidate.
Preparing or circulating fliers or handouts can improve the
quality of the environment.
It is possible to improve the quality of the environment by
wearing a shirt or button that expresses a "pro-
environmental" viewpoint.
It is possible to improve the quality of the environment by
writing or phoning public officials.
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effective"™?"^ ab°Ut ?nvir°nmental issues can be anctive way cf improving the quality of the environment.
environment!
110"5 *"* h6lP t0 imProve th* 1-lity of the
Tt th^envLonmenr?3110" ~^ *»
It is possible to improve the miaiifv *-u
ca^CesCrProgise" ^ S ^ S~=»^
he^to^roee^he^SfS the^ronmen^ ~ «*
Voting can do little to improve the quality of theenvironment. M y n
TOrkinrfor
b
a
e
^? i^r?Ve *5? of the environment bywo K g fo pol tical candidate who holds "oro-environmental" views.
the
e
aua??tv n?
1
^
°r d
?monstrati°n can do little to improveq li y of the environment.
pLkLnp1?^. 1^^6 the quality of the envi™nt ^
Boycotting environmentally irresponsible products can nothelp to improve the quality of the environment.
Participating in a recycling program can be an effective
way of improving the quality of the environment.
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APPENDIX G
PERSONAL U MASS FINANCIAL SITUATION EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Action ItemR
There is little I can do to create political chanqe thatwould improve the financial situation at U Mass?
I don't see how I could get our leaders to work harder toimprove the financial situation at U Mass.
n
I can get the government to work toward improving thefinancial situation at U Mass.
I have no power to influence the political process in sucha way that would improve the financial situation at U Mass.
I can change the way things are run in this state in such away that would help to improve the financial situation at UMass
.
Explicit Action Items
I can improve the financial situation at U Mass by meetinq
with elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way for me to improve the financial situation at
U Mass.
I can improve the financial situation at U Mass by trying
to convince others to adopt a "pro-educational funding"
viewpoint.
I can improve the financial situation at U Mass by
attending meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible for me to improve the financial
situation at U Mass by contributing money to a political
organization or political candidate.
By preparing or circulating fliers or handouts, I can
improve the financial situation at U Mass.
I can improve the financial situation at U Mass by wearing
a shirt or button that expresses a "pro-
educational funding" viewpoint.
I can improve the financial situation at U Mass by writing
or phoning public officials.
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effec?ive
n
war?or
a
^^
educational Ending issues can be an
U Mass
Y ^ t0 imProve financial situation at
StSS^^SS!' 1 can help to improve the
By working for an activist organization, I can helo toimprove the financial situation at U Mass.
I can improve the financial situation at U Mass by trying
cand?d!J^
e
°therS t0 V°te f°r "Pro-educational fund™didates or programs. y
My attending a political workshop on the financial
situation It n m
333 n0t help to imPr°ve the financial
a U Mass.
sftn^nn tl^t™* ^ d° little to imPr°ve the financialituation at U Mass.
I can improve the financial situation at u Mass by workinqfor a political candidate who holds "pro-educationalfunding" views.
My attending a rally or demonstration can do little toimprove the financial situation at U Mass.
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APPENDIX H
IMPERSONAL U MASS FINANCIAL SITUATION EFFICACY ITEMS
Implicit Action Items
^nrnvo
h
,h
an
,
be d°?S to
.
create Political change that wouldimprove t e financial situation at U Mass.
It is difficult to get our leaders to work harder toimprove the financial situation at U Mass.
It is possible to get the government to work towardimproving the financial situation at U Mass.
There is no way to influence the political process in sucha way that would improve the financial situation at S Mass,
It is possible to change the way things are run in thisstate in such a way that would help to improve thefinancial situation at U Mass.
Explicit Action Items
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Massby meeting with elected representatives.
Writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine can be an
effective way of improving the financial situation at U
Mass.
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Massby trying to convince others to adopt a "pro-educational
funding" viewpoint.
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Mass
by attending meetings of a political organization or group.
It is not possible to improve the financial situation at U
Mass by contributing money to a political organization or
political candidate.
Preparing or circulating fliers or handouts can improve the
financial situation at U Mass.
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Mass
by wearing a shirt or button that expresses a "pro-
educational funding" viewpoint.
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Mass
by writing or phoning public officials.
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Getting informed about educational funding issues can be an
M^ss? ^
°f improvin
^
the financial situation a? U
Signing petitions can help to improve the financialsituation at U Mass.
Working for an activist organization can help to improvethe financial situation at U Mass. F
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Mass
fund^"g. h -HnrnCe °therS t0 V°te for "Pro-educationalunding candidates or programs.
Attending a political workshop on the financial situation
at U Mass can not help to improve the financial situation
at U Mass.
Voting can do little to improve the financial situation atU Mass.
It is possible to improve the financial situation at U Massby working for a political candidate who holds "pro-
educational funding" views.
Attending a rally or demonstration can do little to improve
the financial situation at U Mass.
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APPENDIX I
POLITICAL ACTIVISM ITEMS
Prepared or circulated fliers or handouts
Wrote or phoned public officials
Worked for an activist organization
or^rograms^
11106
°
therS t0 V°te f°r ?articular candidates
Got informed about a political issue
Voted for a candidate primarily because he or she holdscertain political views
Worked for a political candidate
Wore a shirt or button that expresses a certain political
viewpoint
Met with elected representatives
Attended a rally or demonstration
Attended a workshop on a political issue
Signed a petition
Tried to convince others to adopt a certain political
viewpoint
Wrote a letter to a newspaper or magazine
Contributed money to a political organization or political
candidate
Attended meetings of a political organization or group
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APPENDIX J
ANTI-NUCLEAR WAR ACTIVISM ITEMS
2t£i2t ™La^onhreat ° f nUClear W- ^ for an
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by attemotina tnconvince others to vote for "anti-nuclear weapons^ 9candidates or programs pons
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by gettinginformed about the issue
^Hd/? redUCG ^he threat of ™clear war by voting for a
^apons»
e
v?ewr
rilY he 0r She
"anti-nuclear
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by working for apolitical candidate who holds "anti-nuclear weapons" views
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by wearing ashirt or button that expresses an "anti-nuclear weapons"
viewpoint p
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by meeting with
elected representatives
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by attending a
rally or demonstration
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by attending a
workshop on nuclear war
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by signing a
petition
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by attempting to
convince others to adopt an "anti-nuclear weapons"
viewpoint
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by writing a
letter to a newspaper or magazine
Tried to reduce the threat of nuclear war by contributing
money to a political organization or political candidate
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APPENDIX K
PRO-ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVISM ITEMS
Tried to improve the quality of the environment bvpreparing or circulating fliers or handouts Y
or^L^ °f ^ -^-ment by writing
^^l^^^J^ ° f the environment by working
Tried to improve the quality of the environment byattempting to convince others to vote for "pro-
environmental" candidates or programs
iSJji^S the quality of the environment by gettinqinformed about the issue y utmg
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by votinqtor a candidate primarily because he or she holds "oro-environmental views" p
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by workingtor a political candidate who holds "pro-environmental"
views
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by wearing
a shirt or button that expresses a "pro-environmental"
viewpoint
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by meeting
with elected representatives
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by
attending a rally or demonstration
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by
attending a workshop on the environment
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by signing
a petition
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by
attempting to convince others to adopt a "pro-
environmental" viewpoint
Tried to improve the quality of the environment by writing
a letter to a newspaper or magazine
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contributing6 ^ qUalit^ ° f the environment by
candidate
1119^ t0 * Politi<^ organization o/political
attend!na^f^6 the^^V of the environment byi g meetings of a political organization or group
ll
ie
iltl°er
ilaPrOVe qUaUty
° f the environment by picking
imProYe the quality of the environment byboycotting environmentally irresponsible products
Tried to improve the quality of the environment byparticipating m a recycling program
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APPENDIX L
IMPROVING U MASS FINANCIAL SITUATION ACTIVISM ITEMS
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass bvpreparing or circulating fliers or handouts
Tried to improve the financial situation at u Mass bvwriting or phoning public officials
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass bvworking for an activist organization
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
?nnH?^i
ng t
2- S°?
vinCe others to vote for "Pro-educationalfu ding" candidates or programs
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass bvgetting informed about the issue
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
voting for a candidate primarily because he or she holds
"pro-educational funding" views
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
working for a political candidate who holds "pro-
educational funding" views
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
wearing a shirt or button that expresses a "pro-educational
funding" viewpoint
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
meeting with elected representatives
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
attending a rally or demonstration
Tried to help improve the financial situation at U Mass by
attending a workshop on the financial situation at U Mass
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
signing a petition
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
attempting to convince others to adopt a "pro-educational
funding" viewpoint
Tried to improve the financial situation at U Mass by
writing a letter to a newspaper or magazine
89
riel'I°JmprOVe the financial situation at U Mass bvcontributing money to a political n*™*^ • Y .
candidate organization or political
improYe the financial situation at U Mass bvattending meetings of a political organization or group
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APPENDIX M
QUESTIONNAIRES
Questionnaires Containing Political Fffi cacv T tping
Belief Typ g>
1. Personal
2
. Personal
3
. Personal
4
. Impersonal
5. Impersonal
6
.
Impersonal
Activism
Political
Political
Political
Political
Political
Political
Activi sin
Anti-nuclear war
Pro-environmental
Improve U Mass
Anti-nuclear war
Pro-environmental
Improve U Mass
Questionnaires Containing T^np- specif i n Ffncacv ^gms
Belief Typg and Issue
1. Personal Nuclear War
2
.
Personal Environment
3. Personal U Mass
4. Impersonal Nuclear War
5. Impersonal Environment
6. Impersonal U Mass
Activism
Anti-nuclear war
Pro-environmental
Improve U Mass
Anti-nuclear war
Pro-environmental
Improve U Mass
Twelve additional questionnaires were constructed in
which the activism items are presented before the efficacy
items, yielding a total of 24 questionnaires. For the
questionnaires containing political efficacy items, the
political activism items always appear before the issue-
specific activism items.
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APPENDIX N
IMPLICIT ACTION PERSONAL BELIEFS ITEMS
Political Efficacy Items
It is possible for me to influence the government.
I have no power to influence the decisions of our leaders.
change"
01 P°SSible for me to cr*ate significant political
It is possible for me to influence political decisions.
I can have an impact on the political system.
Nuclear Efficacy Items
It is possible for me to influence the government in such a
way that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
I have no power to influence our leaders to make decisionsthat would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is not possible for me to create significant political
change that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible for me to influence political decisions in
such a way that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
I can have an impact on the political system that would
help to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
Environmental Efficacy Items
It is possible for me to influence the government in such a
way that would improve the quality of the environment.
I have no power to influence our leaders to make decisions
that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is not possible for me to create significant political
change that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is possible for me to influence political decisions in
such a way that would improve the quality of the
environment.
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I can have an impact on the political system that wouldhelp to improve the quality of the environment
U Mass Efficacy Jtnmc
2viJhS'!?}!l ?°r mS t0 influence the government in such away t at would improve the financial situation at U Mass?
I have no power to influence our leaders to make decisionsthat would improve the financial situation at U Mass.
It is not possible for me to create significant politicalchange that would improve the financial situation at UMass
.
It is possible for me to influence political decisions insuch a way that would improve the financial situation at UMass
I can have an impact on the political system that wouldhelp to improve the improve the financial situation at UMass
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APPENDIX O
IMPLICIT ACTION IMPERSONAL BELIEFS ITEMS
Political Efficacy Items
It is possible to influence the government.
It is possible to influence the decisions of our leaders.
It is not possible to create significant political change.
It is possible to influence political decisions.
It possible to have an impact on the political system.
Nuclear Efficacy Items
It is possible to influence the government in such a waythat would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to influence our leaders to make decisions
that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is not possible to create significant political change
that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to influence political decisions in such a
way that would reduce the threat of nuclear war.
It is possible to have an impact on the political system
that would help to reduce the threat of nuclear war.
Environmental Efficacy Items
It is possible to influence the government in such a way
that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is possible to influence our leaders to make decisions
that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is not possible to create significant political change
that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is possible to influence political decisions in such a
way that would improve the quality of the environment.
It is possible to have an impact on the political system
that would help to improve the quality of the environment
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U Mass Efficacy Tj-^ c
It is possible to have an impact on the political system
si?ua??on
dienPMt0 imPr°Ve the impr0ve **• financial
^
t ti at U ass.
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